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Ecology without the Present
Timothy Morton
I learned a new word today. Atom bomb. It was like a white light in
the sky. Like God taking a photograph. Empire of the Sun (movie)
The fact of the Anthropocene makes it impossible even for the most
recalcitrant metaphysician of presence to get a grip on ecological
reality. Yet the Anthropocene is only potent because it magnifies a
fundamental feature of reality for human inspection. This feature is
the nonexistence of the present as such, the reason why the metaphysics
of presence is doomed to fail. In arguing for this I shall be making a
number of ontological points that some normative forms of Derridean
thinking might resist. Yet I hope that the reader will find that my
conclusions are, if not within this normative framework, still thinkable
within a certain deconstruction.
[I]l n’y a pas de hors-texte. Without doubt this is the single most
potent and memorable thing that Derrida ever wrote. But what on
Earth does it mean? Detractors of deconstruction are too hasty to assert
that it means that everything is made of language. If ever there were a
system that viewed everything as language, it would be structuralism.
If deconstruction does anything at all, it is to show how structuralism,
like any logocentric system, is unable to account for certain phenomena
that it must include–exclude without ever being able to assimilate
them. Happily Gayatri Spivak’s translation hesitates at this precise
sentence, and gives us two translations, an act of doubling that itself
refutes in advance that idea that everything is made of language. In
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the uncanny déjà-vu Spivak sets up, something appears–disappears,
is included–excluded: something is discovered to have fallen out of
logocentrism. The first translation is, ‘There is nothing outside of the
text.’ The second translation, which I find preferable, is this: ‘There is
no outside-text.’1
In the following, I shall be taking the liberty of reading the il
n’y a pas as something like a comment on Levinas’ il y a—the
environmentality of the there is. In other words, I shall assume that
the there or the there is not opens the problem of what constitutes
existence as envrionmentality— as a there that cannot be specified as a
particular ‘existent’ in Levinas’ language.2 What is being thought here
is the notion of nothing or of nothingness.
To claim that outside the text there is absolutely nothing is to
assert that everything indeed is text. Yet this very statement is self-
refuting, because it already relies on an ontology that posits an absolute
nothing—an oukontic nothing that one could think as ‘not even
nothing’. We are, in that case, already outside the text, insofar as we
are asserting something about reality. Derrida, a painstaking reader
of Heidegger, would surely have understood how there is at least
one other ontological possibility in the ‘nothing’, namely, a meontic
nothing, the (presence of the) absence of something.3 It is the very
sliding between one translation and the other that reveals this strange,
not-quite-present nothing, like the curtain of a theater which, when
raised, reveals another curtain of exactly the same shade of grey.
Nothing(ness) happens.
Nothing(ness) can be text, there is no outside-text, in other words,
the text is unable to talk about at least one entity that it must
include–exclude in order to be coherent. As a result, nothing in the
text is fully present. The nothingness in (and as) the text, departs
from full presence. Derrida’s assertion il n’y a pas de hors-texte is a
radar signal reflected from the tip of an iceberg of a weird realism
that denies to (real) things their ontic givenness. Even within the
(still onto-theological) realm of Heidegger, this flicker on the radar
screen is a trace of the nonhuman: a human being is merely the radio
operator who receives the echo, who attunes herself to it.4 The echo of
what? Of nothing(ness). What nothingness? The shadow of a thing—a
physical entity whose parameters we shall shortly define. But in terms
of recognisably written texts, what is included–excluded by the text is
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an inscribable surface, linguistic conventions, ink, paper, wood pulp,
trees, saws, paper mills, society, forests. . . Thus a text is what ‘hides
from the first comer, from the first glance, the laws of its composition
and the rules of its game’.5
At the very moment at which nothingness was making its way via
Buddhism throughHegel into the thinking that resulted in Heidegger’s
Destruktion, a thin layer of carbon was being deposited in Earth’s crust.
This carbon layer, the result of the industrial processes of modernity,
can now be found in Arctic ice sheets and deep lakes. One can’t say
that this was the beginning of the Anthropocene. One can only say
that in light of this event, which is just coming to light for humans,
the Anthropocene was and is and shall be. The text ‘Anthropocene’
is retroactively posited, a radar signal from a weird event, an event
at which human and geological temporalities intersected one another.
Was it the end of history, or the beginning? It was certainly the
beginning of the end of the world, not as a decisive apocalypse or
closure, but as the opening of a far more uncanny historicity, in which
humans realise we are living on after the end of the world, that is,
of a coherent text: Nature, world, lifeworld, Weltanschauung, world-
picture, and their concomitant media objects such as Gesamtkunstwerk,
rendering, simulation, Romanticism; even system, biosphere, ecosystem,
environment. These coherent texts must always include–exclude some
entity (or more) in order to maintain coherence. The ecological
thought, a thought that I claim is now in varied ways occurring to
everyone on this planet, just is the deconstruction of this coherence.
In a strange doubling, another déjà-vu, another moment in the
Anthropocene stands out. In 1945 the Gadget tested at Trinity
New Mexico and the atomic bombs Little Boy and Fat Man begin
to deposit a thin layer of radioactive materials in Earth’s crust. A
second inscription event, the marker of something that has already
happened that is now appearing, for humans. A good translation
of Anthropocene is There is no outside-human text. Yet for this very
reason, the nonhuman has made decisive contact with the human. The
nonhuman has been discovered always already to have been inhabiting
social, psychic and philosophical space. To use a current metaphor,
the human is always already occupied by nonhumans. There they
are, camping on the smooth lawns of our coherence, posing to us
with threatening gentleness something like Bartleby’s ‘I would prefer
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not to.’6 Anthropocene then is an ironic term. Perhaps Ananthropocene
would have been more like it, or Anthropocene.
In the Spielberg movie of Empire of the Sun, the boy Jim remarks that
the Hiroshima explosion was ‘Like God taking a photograph.’7 The
very pinnacle of modernity, encapsulated in Robert Oppenheimer’s ‘I
am become death, shatterer of worlds’, is the arrival of what Heidegger
would have called the last god if he had been able to include nonhumans
in his view.8 Heidegger simply was unable to ascertain how this last
god would manifest in the very core of technological enframing.9
The poison is indeed the saving power, or not. For it is gigantic
nonhuman beings— radioactive materials, global warming, the very
script of the layers in Earth’s crust that opens the Anthropocene—
who bring about the end of the world. I am calling these gigantic
nonhumans hyperobjects, objects that are massively distributed in time
and space relative to humans. Hyperobjects bring about the beginning
of history, ‘the other beginning’, as Heidegger puts it, outside of
the texts that have reduced beings to ontic giveness (hypokeimenon,
energeia, substantia, subjectum, subject, object).10
Like God taking a photograph: the nonhuman sees us, in the
white light of its fireball, hotter than the sun. Like God: this is not
an endorsement of a scholastic causa sui inhabiting a beyond, but a
reminder that we are dealing with a physical entity. Yet this is a weird
physical entity, with all the fateful force of that term. But to what are
we listening when we attune to the hyperobject? Is this uncertainty not
precisely what we are hearing? Isn’t it the case that the affect delivered
to us in the rain, the weird cyclone, the oil slick, is something uncanny?
If it has a name perhaps it is weirdness, or creepiness. Perhaps the most
telling term is the word doom.
What is doom? Conventionally, doom is a decree or an ordinance:
a directive.11 Doom is also judgment, law, the faculty of judging, the
final judgment that happens after the end of the world.12 Yet doom
is also what we deem, opinion, discernment.13 Doom can mean fate,
destiny, and in a stronger sense, death.14 Finally doommeans justice, or
even judge, one who dispenses justice.15 Justice is a figure that Derrida
calls synonymous with deconstruction in that it is irreducibly futural:
perfect justice can never be achieved now— there is always a remainder
to come.16 A good judge doesn’t just mechanically dole out judgments,
but paradoxically enforces and suspends the law at the same time.
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Doesn’t this rich range of meanings suggest something about the
hyperobject? The hyperobject is indeed the bringer of fate, destiny,
death. This destiny comes from beyond the (human) world, and
pronounces or decrees the end of the world. This decree marks a
decisive pivot in Earth history in which humans discern the nonhuman
and thus reckon the fate of Earth with a greater justice. Or, just to go
hog wild Heidegger style for a moment: doom comes from doom and
dooms doom; this doom marks a decisive moment in which humans
doom the nonhuman and thus doom the doom of Earth with greater
doom.
Each political and ethical decision is made on the inside of a
hyperobject, caught in the resonance of the zones that spell doom.
It is the end of the world, because it is the end of ontic givenness,
which includes presence. For a world to be coherent, there must be
a hither and a yonder, a now and a then. Nuclear materials like other
hyperobjects are so massively distributed in time and space that they
end the idea that time is a neutral container that is outside the physical
universe. This idea is discovered always already to have depended
upon a stable (human) vantage point. The synthetic judgment a priori
that Kant argues grounds the condition for the possibility for human
apprehension of objects is just one of a plenum of such events. The
bomb emits its own spacetime, like radiation, just as Earth emits
spacetime in relativity theory (and indeed this laptop, my fingers, this
cup of coffee). The bomb occupies the human. Plutonium 239 decays
for twenty four thousand years. In twenty-four thousand years, the
following will be true: (1) No one will be meaningfully related to
me in particular; (2) The slightest thing I do now will have grave
consequences.17 At this scale there is no me, no human even, worth
talking about—yet what I do ‘now’ affects what happens ‘then’. Even
more so, global warming is also disturbingly futural. I call its three
main time scales the horrifying, the terrifying and the petrifying. There
is a horrifying time scale of five hundred years (75% of global warming
effects still happening); a terrifying one of thirty thousand years (25%
still happening); and a petrifying one of one hundred thousand years
(7% still happening).18 Likewise geological time, emerging for humans
since the advent of modernity, is an abyss whose reality becomes
increasingly uncanny, not less, the more scientific instruments are able
to probe it. Knowledge ceases to be demystification, if it ever was.
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Now evaporates into a sickening relative motion of traffic between
past and future. Perhaps it is better so say that now evaporates into
nowness: something is still happening, but it is impossible in advance
to draw a thin, rigid boundary around it. The past simply is appearance.
The thin layer of carbon, the thin layer of radioactive materials, are the
appearance of the past in the Arctic ice, in deep lakes, in Earth’s crust.
My face is a map of everything that happened to it. This coffee cup is
a record of the traumas undergone by a lump of clay as it was molded
and fired and glazed. Form is appearance: form is the past. The form of
an object is not present, but is rather an archaeological record. There
is no matter per se, since the lump ‘of’ clay is also a form that has been
traumatised in unique ways by extraction, parceling, shipping. Matter
is matter-for, not some ontically given substrate, some hypokeimenon
that underlies things.19 Radioactive materials and global warming—
hyperobejcts— simply compel us to see this.
Likewise, myself just is a record of what has happened to ‘me’.
As Freud argues, ego just is the text of abandoned object cathexes.20
Why can Freud say this? Because objects are already that: the record
of trauma. At this ontological level, there is not so much difference
between me and a coffee cup, or between me and Earth’s crust. Earth is
geotrauma, a palimpsest of necessarily violent inscription events.21 The
beginning of myself, of a cup, of a crustal layer, is impossible to specify,
since cup and me and so on just are retroactive positings of traumatic
events. The ecological thought is a weird return to Aristotle, the Aristo-
tle who refuted the idea that time could be a succession of now-points,
the Aristotle who elevated formal causation above others (telos, func-
tion, matter). This is an Aristotle without telos, and without presence.
What of the future? The past is appearance. Essence is the future.
I use the term essence not to denote some real underlying appearances,
like the boring cupcake under the sprinkles of accidence, the default
ontology that we have been operating with since Aristotle. We have
already dispensed with this notion, since appearance is not a superficial
coating, but the very form of a thing, the text of its abandoned object
cathexes. Appearance is not only appearance-for some other entity— a
camera, a frog, a scholar. Without anyone to observe it, the radioactive
layer in Earth’s crust is there. That’s the whole point: its detection must
be belated. Time just is an emission of objects, as basic Einstein tells
us, and so for the same reasons is space.
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What then is essence? Essence is the arrivant, the never-present to-
come of a thing. An infinitely exploded view of an object, under
all possible lighting conditions and for all sentient beings, is not
that object. Merleau-Ponty’s argument that this constitutes a thing
is just a fantasy.22 When I turn over the cup, the cup now has
another underside. The very familiar narrative in which Husserl’s
insight about the letterbox becomes Derrida’s reworking of protension
and retension, via Heidegger’s deconstruction of being into futural
Dasein, becomes freshly uncanny. Because what the new weird realisms
such as object-oriented ontology (OOO) do is to return to the
now somewhat neglected jazz standards of Husserl and Heidegger
and rework them within a post-Derridean thinking. To say ‘post-
Derridean’ here means to do philosophy within Derrida’s continuation
of the Heideggerian project of deconstructing the metaphysics of
presence. The implicit truth of there is no outside-text is now more true
than it was when it could be associated with anti-realism in a facile
sense. There is a gigantic coral reef of discrete, unique, irreducible
objects (OOO’s term for any entity whatsoever— a blade of grass,
a meteor, a block of staples) that lies beneath the Heideggerian
U-boat, at a hitherto unplumbed ontological depth. Just when
we thought it was safe never to get back into the ontological
water.
There is no present. There are only past and future—or rather, a
plenum of entities emitting different pasts and futures, that coincide
like ships passing in the night or trains that move relative to one
another (Einstein’s favorite analogy); and the rift between past and
future, appearance and essence. This rift is the nothing that is outside
the text: a happening that the text must include–exclude in order to
be itself. The meaning of a poem is its future: it will have been read
five minutes from now, next week, and more than this, its meaning is
futurality, or as Shelley puts it, ‘the gigantic shadows that futurity casts
upon the present’.23 The past of the poem, its letters, its paper, its ink,
its authors, its readers, its readings, is the appearance of the poem, the
poem’s form. A poem, a hyperobject, is a message in a bottle from the
future. An augury, a writing in entrails or in the sky, without a stable
or consistent system of meaning to underwrite it.
Ecological awareness is without the present. The ‘As I write. . . ’
trope of ecomimesis is without admitting it an elegy to this totally lost
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presence.24 ‘As I write these words, snow is gently falling outside my
hut at the edge of the forest’ is an inverted acknowledgement of the
towering realities of the Anthropocene. The calls for a restoration of
a balance that never existed on Earth—Earth being the name for a
text of geotrauma—are desperate attempts to put the genie back in
the bottle. The perverse triumphalism that rubbernecks the sadistic
victory of Gaia over lifeforms deemed improper— the viral human—
is a futile attempt to master the irreducible uncanny futurality of things:
all things— a Styrofoam cup that lasts for five hundred years, a dog
dosed with strontium 90 encased in a block of concrete for forty years,
the shadow of a human impressed on a Hiroshima wall.25
A more genuine acknowledgement of what is happening— the
opening for humans of the rift between essence and appearance, the
vanishing of the present and of presence— is the work of Butoh,
the Japanese ‘dance of darkness’ that was invented in the wake
of Hiroshima.26 In Butoh, the human body no longer floats as if
weightless in abstract space, but is pressed down from all sides by a
horrible gravity, the spacetime emitted by a gigantic object, preventing
the human from achieving escape velocity. The waves of other beings
distort the human face into sickening masks of itself— faces that are
already heavily made up to appear mask-like. The body is powdered
with ash as if from the fallout of an atomic bomb.27 Cinders, ash, the
trace of there is no outside-text, the shadow of a holocaust.28
What is happening to reality in the Anthropocene is that it is
becoming more vivid and unreal. Without a world, without Nature,
nonhumans crowd into human space, leering like faces in a James
Ensor painting or the faces of Butoh dancers. The difference between
a face and a mask (Greek, proso¯pon) collapses. Without presence,
habitual, ontically given coordinates of meaningfulness dissolve: ‘What
constitutes pretense is that, in the end, you don’t know whether it’s
pretense or not.’29 This irreducible unreality is a symptom of reality
as such, with which the weird realisms (speculative realism, object-
oriented ontology) are beginning to cope, as emergent features of the
uncanny intersection of geotrauma and human history. Covered in ash
the human dances, caught in a horrible physicality: physicality without
a beyond, without an outside, without presence.
Rice University
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